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Investment in research and development may (with some probability) lead to reductions
in a firm’s production cost.  If the production-cost savings associated with successful research
and development is freely disseminated to other firms as soon as it is realized, too few resources
may be allocated to this input.  In such an environment, subsidies to the public input can lead to
optimal input use.  Four alternative subsidy instruments are considered in this paper.  Two are
incremental subsidies and the others are conventional level subsidies.  One of the incremental
subsidies and one of the level subsidies crudely capture characteristics of incentive mechanisms
used in the United States and Canada.  A laboratory implementation of these instruments
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Introduction
In the 1970s and early 1980s considerable concern had been raised regarding sustained
declines in industrial productivity and in the rate of industrial innovation by Canadian firms.  It
was feared that this would adversely affect the competitiveness of Canadian firms in global
markets.  Many researchers have attributed this decline in productivity and technological
advancements to declines in industrial investment in research and development activities.  As a
consequence, questions were raised about the incentives to devote resources to research and
development which were provided to Canadian businesses by federal and provincial
governments.  The governments of many countries provide subsidies to firms in their
jurisdictions with whom Canadian firms compete in international markets.  This helps them
reduce the cost of research and development activities (an example of such a subsidy is the
ability to charge current research and development expenses against current revenues when
determining corporate income taxes, even if the research and development expenses are for
capital goods), and may provide a competitive edge over other firms.
In an attempt to promote the innovative efforts of the private sector, the Canadian federal
government amended the Canadian Tax Act in 1986 to provide firms several tax incentives to
spend money on research and development.  The most significant incentive was a tax credit equal
to 35 percent of the value of qualified research and development expenditures each year (this is
now 20 percent for large businesses and 35 percent for small businesses).  In addition to the tax1  Four Canadian provinces provide incentives for expenditures on research and
development which augment the federal government incentives.  Only Ontario provides an
incremental expenditure subsidy.
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credit, firms were permitted to treat the research and development expenses incurred in any tax
year as fully depreciable in the year of purchase.  The change in the Tax Act with regard to
expenditures on research and development inputs was meant to provide Canadian firms with tax
incentives comparable to those enjoyed by their competitors.
The United States’ Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981 provided U.S. firms
with similar tax incentives as those included in the Canada Tax Act in 1986.  The tax credit
offered to U.S. firms was different from the Canadian credit in several respects.  First, the
proportion of U.S. research and development expenditures which were eligible for tax credit was
set at 25 percent (but reduced to 20 percent in 1986) and, second, the basis of the credit was the
increase in research and development expenditures in any year above the average amount spent
during the previous three years.  A third difference is that the U.S. credit may only be applied
against taxes due, while the Canadian credit may result in a net transfer from general tax
revenues to the subsidized firm.
These differences between the U.S. and Canadian treatments of expenditures on research
and development persisted into the 1990s.  Warda (1994) describes the treatment of research and
development expenditures by eleven industrial countries.  Only Canada and Australia subsidize
these expenditures based on the level of expenditures in a year rather than on the incremental
expenditure.
1  The U.S., France, and Japan are among the countries which offer subsidies based
on incremental expenditures.
Hughes and McFetridge (1985) investigate the impact of a subsidy based on the level of3
annual expenditure versus an alternative one based on incremental expenditure in a single-firm
dynamic optimization context.  They identify multiple theoretical equilibria including cyclical
investment patterns when increases in investment are subsidized.
Attempts have been made to evaluate the effectiveness of the ERTA in stimulating
research and development spending (see Baily et al. 1985, Barth et al. 1984, Berger 1993, Brown
1984 and 1985, Eisner et al. 1984, McCutchen 1993, Shehata and Ebrahim 1992).  These report
conflicting results but raise doubts about the effectiveness of the ERTA to stimulate increases in
research and development spending.  The evidence provided by these studies is limited by the
methodologies employed (field or questionnaire data) and the collateral assumptions regarding
the specific characteristics of firms and the extent to which innovations are appropriable across
firms.   Furthermore, tax policies are typically confounded in the field with a variety of shocks
which are difficult for the analyst to control.
Researchers have attempted to control for many of the confounding factors present in
field data by studying the incentives to invest in research and development activities in laboratory
environments (see Davis, Quirmbach, and Swenson 1995, Isaac and Reynolds 1986).  A common
thread running through the research and development literature and reflected by these laboratory
studies is that the producers competing in product markets will overinvest in research and
development resources as they race to be the first to develop a new technology which can be
excluded from competing producers and gain a cost advantage for themselves.  Generally, the
implications from this sort of environment is that research and development should somehow be
regulated to avoid this supra-optimal allocation of research and development activities.
While tax incentives offered by national governments to producers in their jurisdictions4
generally are intended to aid national producers gain competitive advantages in international
markets, there is always the sense that this is being done because it is good to develop new
technologies and innovate ceteris paribus.   As a starting point for the analysis of the
effectiveness of alternative incentives to investment in research and development resources we
are introducing a much simpler question, set in a much simpler environment.  First, under what
conditions would the subsidy of research and development activities clearly be an efficient
policy?  Second, what are alternative ways to implement subsidy schemes?  Third, what are the
theoretic predictions regarding the effectiveness of these alternative schemes?  Finally, if
implemented in a laboratory environment will the theoretic predictions be supported by the data? 
Our results suggest that an incentive scheme similar to that incorporated in the ERTA may not be




The following model attempts to capture features of research and development
expenditures which may be introduced into a controlled laboratory setting.  In this setting the
impact of alternative subsidy schemes can be evaluated.  These subsidy schemes capture some
aspects of tax-credit policies in use in the United States and in Canada.  A perfectly competitive
product market characterizes this environment.  In addition, producers face fixed-production
constraints.  These production constraints may be used as treatment variables to study the impact
of increasing production (or firm size) on the employment of research and development (R&D)5
inputs.  In this paper, however, the impact of firm size is not examined.
Throughout this study it is assumed that the gains from expenditures on R&D by any firm
are easily appropriated by other firms in the industry.  These gains are realized as reductions in
production cost which depreciate fully within one decision period.  R&D is characterized as a
public input.  As such, it is expected that self-interested profit-maximizing producers will
consider the value of investing in the public input to their own cost reduction, but will have no
incentive to consider the benefits other firms will realize from the investing producer’s actions. 
This should lead to under-investing in R&D inputs, and provide a justification for intervention.
Clearly the case of fully appropriable R&D gains which have a one-period lifetime is an
extreme case, but it focusses attention on a situation in which a subsidy is most likely to be a
desirable policy intervention.  A third abstraction introduced in this environment removes the
uncertainty of R&D outcomes.  It is assumed that there is a direct relationship between the level
of R&D investment undertaken and cost reduction.  This presumes that there is an expected
success rate to investment in R&D inputs which is common to the industry and this expected
success rate is realized.  These abstractions permit us to focus on the reaction of decision-makers
to the incentives induced by the alternative schemes which are expected to increase use of R&D
resources.
The Baseline
R&D expenditures result in the reduction of production costs of the firm employing the
R&D inputs as well as other firms in the industry (in this extreme case, diffusion of the new
technology is immediate).  R&D expenditures, however, are not costless.  The typical firm’s
profit function is represented as6
i  Pixi  (x
2
i )/(AR)  ri (1)






i  xi/(N0.5)  A/N (3)
R o  xi￿0.5  A (4)
where   is the profit of firm  ,   is product price,   is output,   is a positive constant,   is i iP i xi AR
the industry’s total investment in R&D,   is the price of a unit of  R&D,   is the number of  ri




If output is treated parametrically, the firm’s only decision is its investment in R&D
inputs.  Assuming this producer’s profit maximizing decisions are characterized by zero
conjectural variations (ZCV), the best response function for the typical producer in a competitive
industry is
If all of the firms in the industry are identical, there is a symmetric Nash equilibrium employment
of R&D for each firm
and a unique Nash equilibrium employment of R&D for the industry
for which any allocation of R&D among the firms in the industry which adds up to   is a Nash R o
equilibrium.  This is the Baseline environment.7
r
￿
i  xi/(N)0.5  A/N (5)
s ￿  (N1)/N (6)
R ￿  xi(N/)0.5  A (7)
If a planner maximized joint profits of the firms in this industry, the symmetric Pareto
optimal employment of R&D for each firm in the industry will be






If the planner subsidizes the employment of R&D resources with the per unit subsidy
for either all R&D resources employed or for those employed beyond   ,  profit ¯ r < r ￿
maximizing ZCV producers will find   units of R&D inputs is a symmetric Nash equilibrium.  r
￿
i
The planner’s choice for R&D investment
will be the unique Nash equilibrium investment for the industry under either subsidy, but any
allocation of R&D investment among firms in the industry which adds up to  is a Nash R ￿
equilibrium.  These per unit subsidies, based on all R&D inputs or only those beyond the
threshold  , are called the C1- and C2-Subsidies, respectively (they reflect the Canadian ¯ r
environment which uses level rather than incremental subsidies).
If the firms in the industry can coordinate their R&D decisions, they could maximize the
industry’s profit (including the subsidy payment) by investing in2  The socially optimal allocation of resources to R&D inputs maximizes the firms’ joint
profits.  If a subsidy is introduced, the resources transferred to firms must come from firms and
individuals in the economy.  In the formulation of this laboratory environment, the assumption is
that the subsidized firms do not finance their own subsidizes.  These come from others.  If firms
cooperatively act to maximize their joint profits (revenues from the sale of output less production
costs less R&D input costs plus subsidies), their economic profits (revenues less production and
R&D input costs) will be less than under optimal R&D input use.  Because the subsidy is simply
a transfer of resources among firms and individuals in the economy, it does not contribute to the
social surplus.
8
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where  .  This is neither a Nash equilibrium allocation nor a socially optimal allocation.
2  ˆ R > R ￿
It can be maintained only through cooperation of the producers.  Each, however, has an incentive
to reduce his R&D expenditure from the joint profit maximizing expenditure.
The U-Subsidies
An alternative to the per unit level subsidy is a subsidy paid to producers for increases in
R&D expenditures from decision period to decision period.  This subsidy can take two different
forms.  The first is 
and is the U1-Subsidy.  The second3  This formulation does not discount profits received in future periods.  If future profits
were discounted, the subsidy terms would not be eliminated from the first-order conditions in the
first   periods of the U1-Subsidy.  The effect would be to reduce the price of the R&D input T1






is the U2-Subsidy.  Investment changes in R&D inputs in period  by firm   is subsidized by  ti s ￿
per unit change.  In the case of the U1-Subsidy, increases in investment in R&D resources are
rewarded, while reductions in investment in R&D resources are penalized.  In the case of the U2-
Subsidy, increases in R&D resources are rewarded, while decreases are not penalized (the U1-
and U2-Subsidy schemes resemble the U.S. environment).  Different solutions may emerge with
these subsidy programs.
The U1-Subsidy
Consider the U1-Subsidy (reward for increasing investment and penalty for reducing
investment) and the profit function
where  .  The R&D input   appears in i,t  Pi,txi,t  x
2
i,t/(ARt)  ri, t  s ￿(ri, t  ri, t￿1) ri, t
the profit expression for periods   and  .  In the former period it appears twice, in the latter it tt 1
appears once.  The first-order conditions for the maximization of profit,  , result in a set of best i
response functions identical to those in the Baseline environment in each decision period if there
is not a final period.  In this case,   is the industry Nash equilibrium investment in R&D.  If R o
there is a finite end period,  , the first-order conditions for each firm for period   will be TT
identical to that for the C-Subsidies.  If the market continues for a finite number of decision
periods,  , in each period, up through  , the Nash equilibrium R&D investment is  , but TT 1 R o
in period   the Nash equilibrium R&D investment rises to  .
3   TR ￿the market interest rate).   This reduction is much less than that realized with the C-Subsidies. 
The resulting R&D expenditure will be greater than the Baseline Nash equilibrium expenditure,
but less than the Pareto optimal expenditure.  The outcome will, however, be realized as a Nash
equilibrium.  In period   the Nash equilibrium investment will be the optimal investment  . TR ￿
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(12)
If the firms attempt to cooperate and maximize their joint profit, they will invest in R ￿
units of R&D during the first   periods, and increase their investment to   units in the last T1 ˆ R
period.  In this case, optimal investment will only occur with cooperative behaviour in periods
prior to the last market period.
The U2-Subsidy
Now consider the U2-Subsidy in which the subsidy is paid if investment in R&D
resources are increased, but no penalty is imposed if investment falls from one period to the next. 
The producer who considered maximizing the intertemporal profit function (11) may consider
investing in a low amount of R&D resources in one period and a high amount of resources in the
next period in order to realize a subsidy in alternating periods.  Rather than generating a
symmetric Nash equilibrium in which   units of investment is undertaken in each period, the r o





is a low level of investment, the latter is a higher level of investment.  These values can be found
by maximizing the two-period profit function4  This is comparable to Hughes’ and McFetridge’s (1985) asymmetric subsidy case. 
However, this environment differs from theirs.  They considered only a single profit-maximizing
firm and there is no input externality.  The environment introduced here has four firms whose
input decisions affect the production costs of the other firms.  The comparability which is of
particular note is that when the incremental mechanism can only result in a subsidy, cycling
appears as a profit-maximizing solution for the firm.
11
where the subscripts   and   identify the high and low investment periods.  Given a finite HL
number of periods, the symmetric Nash equilibrium first period investment will equal   and r ￿






4  In the laboratory setting, if participants know when the session will end,
the alternating low and high investments will continue until the last odd-numbered period.  In the
final period, the symmetric Nash equilibrium investment will be  . r ￿
Cooperative behaviour in this case leads to industry input use of   in the first period and ˆ R
will cycle between    and  , where  .  If period T is an even-numbered ˆ RL ˆ RN r
o
L < ˆ RL < R ￿ < ˆ R
period, input use in that period also will be  .  Cooperative behaviour leads to cycling behaviour ˆ R
in which R&D input use is either sub- or supra-optimal. 
Predictions
A prediction from this model for ZCV profit maximizing decision-makers is that the C-
Subsidies of R&D activities can lead to increased employment of R&D resources, which are
initially underprovided.  The U1-Subsidy will not increase the employment of R&D resources
until the final period in the planning horizon.  The U2-Subsidy will lead to increased average
employment of R&D resources over the course of the planning horizon.  A Pareto optimal12
allocation will not be realized as a stable equilibrium, although Pareto optimal allocations will
occur in some periods.  Finally, the extent to which producers are able to cooperate in making
input decisions can affect the ultimate outcome.  In this environment, cooperation can lead to
both more than and less than Pareto optimal allocations as investment in R&D resources cycles
over time.  These predictions of the effects of alternative subsidies to investment in R&D inputs
can be tested in a laboratory setting.
Laboratory Environment
Parameterization
Select the parameters  and obtain  ,   1, A  12, xi,t  24, N  4, Pi,t  2 r
o
i  3
 and  .  For the C2-Subsidy,   is selected r
￿
i  9, r
o
L  2, r
o
H  9, ˆ rL  6, ˆ r  15 s ￿  0.75 ¯ r
to equal the baseline individual symmetric Nash equilibrium input use:  .  R&D investment ¯ r  3
is bounded at   to constrain the payoff table that is presented to participants in the r
max
i  15
laboratory sessions to a 16 by 46 matrix.  The investment predictions described in the previous
section are summarized in Table 1 for these parameter values.  The predicted profits to each
producer over ten periods (T = 10) under ten different scenarios derived from the discussion
above are presented in Table 2 along with the subsidy paid to the producer under each scenario. 
For this analysis the assumption is made that the subsidy is financed from general revenues paid
by others than the producers in the subsidized industry.
Laboratory Implementation5  The subject pool included men and women enrolled in the undergraduate programmes
at McMaster University.  All but four of the subjects had participated in a series of ring-tests to
identify their value orientations.  The four individuals were categorized as individualist (the
category containing the majority of subjects).
6  The groups were not constructed randomly.  A conscious effort was made to guarantee
that the no subject participated with the same three subjects in the three rounds of a session.
13
The experiment was administered using 72 student subjects from McMaster University.
5 
Twelve subjects participated in each session.  Each session lasted for thirty-six decision periods. 
There were six sessions.  In periods 1, 2, 3, 13, 14, 15, 25, 26, and 27 of each session three
groups of four individuals were formed.  The composition of the groups did not change during
periods 3 through 12, 15 through 24, and 27 through 36.
6  Periods 1, 2, 13, 14, 25, and 26 were
practice periods.  They were the first two periods of a new treatment (described as a new round to
the subjects).  The decisions that subjects made in these practice periods did not contribute to
their earnings.  Subjects did not know who was in their group at any time during the session. 
Each period the subjects were reminded that they, and each member of their group, could invest
in up to fifteen units of a special input which could reduce their production costs.  Each member
of the group knew his profit function and that each other member of the group had the same
profit function.
Subjects were given written instructions describing the decisions they had to make and
the environment in which they were participating (see Appendix 1).  The instructions were read
aloud to the subjects and the subjects were given several questions to answer to test their
understanding of the environment.  After the invigilators were convinced that the subjects
understood the environment, the session began.
Subjects were seated at computer terminals separated from each other by partitions.  They7  The details of the implementation of the subsidies are described in the Instructions
included in Appendix 1.
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were given three minutes to choose their input use and to enter it on their computer terminal. 
This input had the characteristic of a public good in production.  The subjects had a payoff table
from which they could determine their payoff conditional on the amount of the input they used
and the amount used by others in their group (see Appendix 2).  After all twelve individuals
entered their contributions, they were informed, via their computer monitors, of the total
contribution made by the others in their group, their payoff for the period, and their accumulated
payoff (exclusive of any subsidies) over all completed periods.  Each individual knew this
information was distributed to the others in the group.  In all cases, the maximum input use by a
group was sixty units per period.  Finally, subjects knew how many periods would be in the
round and the number of rounds in the session.
The subjects did not know how the treatments would change from round to round.  In
rounds which included subsidies for input use, the subsidies were introduced as additions to the
profits realized through production and sale of their product.
7  Subjects received their
accumulated lab dollar payoffs, converted into Canadian dollars, after the thirty-six decision
periods were completed.  The conversion rate was announced at the start of the session.  The
average compensation for participating was $7.59, $11.00, $9.96, $8.21 and $9.10 for the
Baseline, C1-Subsidy, C2-Subsidy, U-1 Subsidy, and U2-Subsidy rounds respectively (standard
deviations $0.76, $0.58, $0.73, $0.92, and $0.61 respectively).  Each session lasted for less than
ninety minutes and included a Baseline round, a C1-Subsidy round, and either a C2-Subsidy, U1-
Subsidy or U2-Subsidy round.  The Baseline round always was first.  The experimental design is8  Nine-period averages are presented because the predicted behaviour in the tenth period
for both the cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios for the U1-Subsidy is very different from
behaviour in the preceding nine periods.  To make average investment data comparable across
treatments, only the first nine periods are pooled.
15
presented in Table 3.
Results
Data
 Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 summarize mean group investment, efficiency, subsidy payments,
and profit by treatment across the first nine periods of each round.
8  Table 8 reports regression
coefficients using the nine-period mean group investment decisions by treatment which control
for subject effects reflecting value orientations.  Average period-by-period group investment is
summarized in Figure 1.
Aggregate Input Use
Mean group input use over the first nine period of each treatment is summarized in Table
4.  The period-by-period averages are shown on Figure 1.  These data provide the bases for eight
observations.
Observation 1:  The quantity of input used by participants in the Baseline
environment is greater than the Nash equilibrium quantity, but much less than the
optimal quantity.
The average input use across all Baseline sessions was 17.01 units.  The Nash equilibrium use is
12 units and the optimal use is 36 units.  A ninety-five percent confidence band around the nine-
period average input use runs from 15.35 units to 18.66 units.  This does not include the Nash9  This is the socially optimal use.  It is not the profit maximizing use which could emerge
if the producers could cooperate.  However, achieving the profit maximizing use would result in
higher production plus R&D input costs than would be realized in the socially optimal state. 
Only producers would gain in this case because of a resource transfer through the subsidy.
16
equilibrium use of 12 units.
Observation 2:  The quantity of input used by participants in the C1-Subsidy
environment is consistent with optimal input use.
The average input use across all C1-Subsidy sessions is 34.70 units.  The Nash equilibrium use is
36 units, which is the optimal use.
9  A ninety-five percent confidence band around the nine-
period average input use runs from 31.34 units to 38.05 units.  The null hypothesis that the
average nine-period mean group input use is equal to 36 units cannot be rejected in favour of the
alternative that it is less than 36 units (t-test, p = 0.212).
Observation 3:  The quantity of input used by participants in the C2-Subsidy
environment falls short of optimal input use.
The average input use across all C2-Subsidy sessions is 29.41 units.  The Nash equilibrium use is
36 units, which is the optimal use.  A ninety-five percent confidence band around the nine-period
average input use runs from 22.98 units to 35.83 units.  The null hypothesis that the average
nine-period mean group input use is equal to 36 units can be rejected in favour of the alternative
that it is less than 36 units (t-test, p = 0.023).
Observation 4:  Neither the U1-Subsidy nor the U2-Subsidy lead to optimal input
use.
The average input use across all U1-Subsidy and U2-Subsidy sessions was 19.80 and 22.11 units
respectively.  Ninety-five percent confidence bands around the nine-period averages are 13.7617
units to 25.83 units and 18.40 units to 25.82 units for the U1-Subsidy and U2-Subsidy
respectively.  Neither of these bands contains 36 units.
Observation 5: The C1-Subsidy successfully corrects the market failure attributed
to the “public” nature of the input but the C2-Subsidy shows significant
improvement over the baseline.  The U2-Subsidy shows some improvement over
the Baseline environment, but the U1-Subsidy shows no significant improvement.
The data in Table 4 suggest that the U-Subsidies provide a modest increase in input use while the
C-Subsidies result in substantial increases in input use.  Randomization tests (Moir 1998)
indicate that the C1-Subsidy input use significantly exceeds that in the other environments (p =
0.000 with an approximate randomization test, p = 0.052, p = 0.001 and p = 0.002 with exact
randomization tests on nine-period mean group input use comparisons with the Baseline, C2-
Subsidy, U1-Subsidy, and U2-Subsidy respectively).  The C2-Subsidy input use also significantly
exceeds that of the Baseline, U1- and U2-Subsidies (p = 0.000, p = 0.010, and p = 0.016
respectively).  The U2-Subsidy provides sufficient incentive to lead to input use which exceeds
that in the Baseline environment (p = 0.003, exact randomization test), but the U1-Subsidy shows
only marginal improvement (p = 0.086, exact randomization test).  A comparison of the U1-
Subsidy and the U2-Subsidy with each other suggests that the latter does not generate more input
use on average than the former (p = 0.203, exact randomization test).  The general observation is
that the C-Subsidies outperform the U-Subsidies.
Observation 6: An efficiency measure further supports the observations that the
Nash equilibrium input use is consistently exceeded, that the C-Subsidies are
successful in leading participants towards optimal input use, and that the U-18
Subsidies only modestly increase production cost savings.
Table 5 presents nine-period mean group efficiency by treatment.  The efficiency measure is the
share of the potential cost savings (when going from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal input
use) which is actually realized under each treatment.  The measure is a percentage of the optimal
net gain that is achieved, because it is calculated using profit values that exclude any subsidy
received.  In the Baseline, the nine-period group average is 32.85 percent.  This measure rises to
91.52 percent with the C1-Subsidy and 83.70 percent with the C2-Subsidy.  It is 42.82 percent
and 57.96 percent with the U1- and U2-Subsidies respectively.  The average efficiency of the C1-
, C2- and U2-Subsidy sessions are significantly different from that of the Baseline session (p =
0.000 with an approximate randomization test and p = 0.000 and p = 0.021 with exact
randomization tests respectively).  The average efficiency of the C2-Subsidy is significantly
different from that of the U2-Subsidy, but the C1-Subsidy only shows marginal improvement
over the C2 treatment in terms of average efficiency (p = 0.022 and p = 0.094 with exact
randomization tests respectively).  The U1-Subsidy and Baseline average efficiencies are not
significantly different (p = 0.248, exact randomization test).  These observations are consistent
with the previous observations.
Observation 7: The C-Subsidies and U2-Subsidy generate significant production
cost savings from Baseline levels.  Each lab dollar of production cost saved
requires more than one lab dollar of subsidy.
Table 6 presents nine-period mean group subsidy payments by treatment and Table 7 presents
profits (excluding subsidy payments) and cost savings by treatment.  The difference between the
profit earned in the Baseline rounds and the profit earned in the subsidy rounds is equal to the19
cost saving realized because of the use of investment in R&D inputs.  The differences between
the mean Baseline profit and the mean profit under the C1-, C2-, and U2-Subsidies are
significant (p = 0.000 with an approximate randomization test, p = 0.000 and p = 0.021 with an
exact randomization tests respectively).  However, the difference between the mean Baseline
profit and mean profit under the U1-Subsidy is not significant (p = 0.249 with an exact
randomization test).
For the treatments which realized significant cost saving, the average per period cost of
the C1-Subsidy was 26.0 lab dollars (L$), the C2-Subsidy, L$15.0, and of the U2-Subsidy, L$9.8. 
These are 1.84, 1.23, and 1.63 times the respective cost savings!
Observation 8: The data support the conjecture that participants behave
according to the non-cooperative equilibrium scenario.
Average group input use is displayed over time in Figure 1.  The patterns of input use for the
Baseline, U1-Subsidy, and U2-Subsidy over the first nine periods are comparable.  The input use
with the U2-Subsidy is consistently above that of the other two treatments.  This is reflected in
the statistical observations reported above.  The levels of input use are not consistent with
cooperative behaviour (see Table 1) during the first nine periods.  The non-cooperative
equilibrium solution predicts that in period 10 participants in the U1-Subsidy treatment will
increase their input use from a low value (12) to the optimal value (36).  The average pattern
reflected in Figure 1 for the U1-Subsidy is consistent with this change in period 10.  The period-
to-period changes in average input use are not significantly different (p > 0.05, Wilcoxon
Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test) from period 1 through period 9.  The change from period 9 to
10 is significant (p = 0.05, Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test).  The non-cooperative20
equilibrium solutions predicts that in periods 9 and 10 the participants in the U2-Subsidy
treatment will increase their input use to 36 units (after fluctuating between 36 and 8 units from
periods 1 through 8).  The fluctuations do not appear in the aggregate data (Figure 1), but in
periods 9 and 10 input use rises above the levels used in previous periods and approaches 36 in
the tenth period.  The predictions for the Baseline and C-Subsidies are that in the former, input
use will be stable and low (at 12) while in the latter it will be stable and high (at 36).  The data
more closely fit these predictions than those of the cooperative model of 36 and 60
respectively.
A ninth observation is based on the data presented in Figures 2 through 6.
Observation 9: Cycling investment decisions characterize only the U2-Subsidy.
  Figures 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 include the per period input decisions of each subject by treatment.  The
non-cooperative equilibrium solution predicts cycles in individual input use for the U2-Subsidy
in which input use rises one period and falls the next.  The cycling should be contained within
the range of 2 and 9 units of input.  The cooperative solution predicts cycles within the range 6
and 15 units of input.  If an individual is identified as adopting a cycling strategy when he
generates at least one M or W pattern in his 10 data points, then cycling is the dominating
characteristic of the U2-Subsidy.  In the U2-Subsidy, this pattern appears in the data for half of
the subjects (12 of 24) in the other four treatments it appears in no more than 12.5 percent of the
subjects’ data (3 of 24 for both the C2- and U1-Subsidies) and as infrequently as 5.5 percent of
the subjects in the C1-Subsidy and 1.4 percent of the subjects in the Baseline treatment (4 of 72
and 1 of 72 respectively).  Although subjects are not able to coordinate their decisions
sufficiently in this environment to generate a cyclical pattern of investment, the many subjects do21
identify the incentive to alternative investment choices between high values in one period and
low values in the next period.
Regression Analysis
Basic regression analysis of the nine-period mean group input decisions by treatment
further substantiate the observations above.  Regression statistics based on the aggregate input
data are summarized in Table 7.  Before the basic regression of average group input use on the
series of treatment dummies was computed (Regression 1 in Table 7), an equation detailing
treatment order was estimated.  Adding dummy variables to Regression 1 for each treatment that
was faced in the last round of a session resulted in new coefficients which were not significantly
different from zero, suggesting that there are no treatment order effects (p = 0.672 with an F-test
on the significance of dummy variables detailing each treatment’s order, and p = 0.973, p =
0.515, p = 0.172 and p = 0.987 using t-tests on the C1-, C2-, U1-, and U2-treatment order
variables respectively).
Sixty-eight of the seventy-two subjects in this experiment participated in a series of
laboratory sessions which elicited information about their value orientation.  The results of these
sessions were used to control for specific subject effects in the analysis of how the four
treatments in this experiment affected the input decisions made by the subjects.
The subjects’ value orientations were determined by their participation in a ring-test
similar to that described by Offerman, Sonnemans, and Schram (1996).  The variable used in the
regression analysis reported in Table 7 is based on the angle of the vector which measures each10  This angle is with respect to the horizontal axis through the origin of a diagram
representing the choices presented to subjects in the ring test.
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subject’s value orientation.
10  The subjects are categorized according to their scores. 
Individualists (subjects who tend to make decisions which maximize their well-being regardless
of others) have value orientation scores between -22.5 degrees and 22.5 degrees (68 percent of
the subjects).  Cooperators (subjects who tend to make decisions which maximize the total
payoff to themselves and an anonymous peer)  have scores between 22.5 degrees and 67.5
degrees (30 percent of the subjects).  One subject was a competitor (a subject who tends to
maximize the difference between his payoff and the payoff of his anonymous peer).  The variable
added in Regression 2 counts the number of group members identified as being cooperators
according to their individual value orientation.  It was expected that the higher the number of
cooperators, the greater will be the input use of the group.
The mean number of cooperators per group (1.111) is used to estimate the Baseline input
use from the regression equation 2 in Table 7.  This yields an estimate of 17.00 units of input for
an average group of four subjects.  The C1-Subsidy has a statistically significant effect on the
group’s contribution, increasing it by 17.69 units, to 34.69 units (p = 0.000, one-tailed t-test). 
The C2-Subsidy has a slightly lower effect on the group’s contribution, increasing it by 12.31
units, to 29.32 units.  While the C2-subsidy is significantly greater than the Baseline treatment (p
= 0.000, one-tailed t-test), the C1- effect is significantly larger than that of the C2-Subsidy (p =
0.015, one-tailed t-test).  The U1-Subsidy has a small positive contribution (3.24 units), but this
is not statistically significant (p = 0.094, one-tailed t-test).  Finally, the U2-Subsidy has a slightly
larger and statistically significant contribution of 4.74 units (p = 0.028, one-tailed t-test).  The23
regression results confirm the observations listed above after controlling for value-orientation
characteristics of groups on input decisions.  As expected, the number of cooperators in a group
significantly increases the average group investment in the input by 1.63 units per Cooperator (p
= 0.022, one-tailed t-test).
Discussion and Conclusions
The subsidy schemes included in the laboratory sessions described in this paper are
extreme abstractions from subsidy schemes which have been used in Canada and the United
States.  The differences between the C1-Subsidy and the U2-Subsidy capture important
differences between the schemes used in the two countries.  In particular, the C1-Subsidy
provides a subsidy to all investment in the public input undertaken in a given period, while the
U2-Subsidy provides a subsidy equal to the difference between the investment in the public input
undertaken in a given period and the average investment undertaken over a previous reference
period.  In the laboratory environment the reference period is the previous period and the baseline
for the subsidy is the investment in that period.  In the field, the reference period is the previous
three years and the baseline for the subsidy is the three-period average investment in the input. 
The U1-Subsidy is an alternative version of the U2-Subsidy in which a penalty is paid if
investment falls below a baseline level.  The laboratory environment provides evidence on the
extent to which the theoretic predictions are realized behaviourally.
The data from the laboratory sessions suggest that non-cooperative play dominates.   
Non-cooperative decision making is predicted to lead to optimal allocations with the C-Subsidies
(with the C1-Subsidy being more costly to implement than the C2-Subsidy), no change from the24
Baseline for the U1-Subsidy and cycling investment (with an average investment exceeding the
Baseline investment) with the U2-Subsidy.
The data show near optimal group allocations to the investment input under the C1-
Subsidy and significant improvement from the Baseline under the C2-Subsidy.  There is no
statistically significant  improvement in input use from the Baseline  under the U1-Subsidy, but
the predicted average improvement in investment from the Baseline is realized under the U2-
Subsidy.  Individual and group behaviour under the U1-Subsidy displayed the large increase in
final-period input use predicted by the theory, while cycling input use was the dominant
characteristic of individual behaviour under the U2-Subsidy.
In spite of the success of the C-Subsidies at generating increased investment, and the
more modest success of the U2-Subsidy, the cost of these schemes appears to be high.  The gains
realized through cost savings associated with the use of the special inputs are less than the money
transferred to the subjects through the subsidy schemes.  This suggests that from the perspective
of distributional effects, if an input subsidy is going to be the policy instrument to induce the
optimal allocation of a public input, it is important that it be integrated with a tax policy which
would permit the subsidizing agency to recover some of the costs of the subsidy from those being
subsidized.  This is particularly important if the gains from the subsidy will immediately accrue
to those being subsidized.
This laboratory environment does not help to evaluate the success or validity of the input
subsidy programmes that have been implemented to encourage R&D investment unless there is a
public input characteristic to this investment which would lead to too little investment in these
inputs in the absence of intervention.  Within this context, however, the incentives of the U-11  The eleven countries are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
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Subsidies are clearly inferior to those of the C-Subsidies.  This is a result that may be applicable
to the subsidy of any activity with public good characteristics.  Therefore, subsidizing increases
in charitable contributions from one period to the next would not be as effective in increasing
contributions to charitable organizations as would subsidizing the contributions themselves.
It is also interesting to note that Warda (1994) ranks Canada and Australia first and
second respectively among eleven industrialized countries with regard to the attractiveness of
their tax treatments for manufacturing companies to engage in R&D activities .
11  Of the eleven,
only Canada and Australia offer level rather than incremental expenditure incentives.
What is unanswered by these laboratory sessions is why the C2-Subsidy failed to perform
as well as the C1-Subsidy, even though the marginal incentives were identical.  The twenty-four
subjects in the Baseline and C1-Subsidy rounds who also participated in the C2-Subsidy rounds
did not behave differently than the other forty-eight subjects who participated in Baseline and
C1-Subsidy rounds (p = 0.347 and p = 0.767 respectively, exact randomization tests). 
Investigating the sensitivity of allocation decisions with respect to the choice of the level of input
use beyond which a subsidy will be paid may shed some light on this result.  Another useful
extension of this work is to incorporate the financing of the subsidy as a constraint on the
participants in the environment.  This would permit an evaluation of the marginal incentive to
increase input use while at the same time assuring that there is not a net transfer from non-
subsidized members of an economy.  This is particularly relevant if the gains from the subsidy
are realized by the members of the subsidized community.26
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Predicted Symmetric Individual and Group Investment Decisions by Period and













Ind’l Group Ind’l Group Ind’l Group Ind’l Group
Baseline 3 12  3 12   9 36     9 36
C1-Subsidy 9 36  9 36 15 60   15 60
C2-Subsidy 9 36  9 36 15 60   15 60











Ind’l Group Ind’l Group Ind’l Group Ind’l Group
U2-Subsidy 2 8 9 36   6 24   15 60
Note:
The planner’s solution is given by the Baseline Cooperative Environment.Table 2
Predicted Individual Profits (excluding subsidy payments) and Subsidy Payments Under




Profit Subsidy Profit Subsidy
Baseline 210.00   0 270.00     0
C1-Subsidy 270.00 67.50 250.00 112.50
C2-Subsidy 270.00 45.00 250.00   90.00
U1-Subsidy 216.00   6.75 268.00   11.25
U2-Subsidy 230.80 27.75 254.00   38.25
Note:
The planner’s solution is given by the Baseline Cooperative Environment.Table 3
Experimental Design: Number of Groups of Four Decision-Makers
Treatments
Round B C1 C2 U1 U2
11 8
29 3 3 3
39 3 3 3
Note: 
Six sessions were run.  Each session consisted of three 12-period rounds with three groups of
subjects.  The allocation of treatments to rounds followed the pattern B-C1-X and B-X-C1,
where X is either C2, U1, or U2.  Each of the treatments, other than the baseline, was in
rounds 2 and 3 an equal number of times.Table 4
Mean Group Investment in Units of Input by Treatment: Periods 1 through 9









































































Average 17.01 34.70   29.41  19.80  22.11 
Nash
Equilibrium
12 36 36 12 23.6
Joint Profit
Maximum
36 60 60 60 44
Pareto
Optimal
36 36 36 36 36
Note:
Under the U2-Subsidy the Nash equilibrium group investment will be 8 in even-numbered
periods and 36 in odd-numbered periods.  If the four individuals maximized joint profits
including the subsidy, investment will be 24 in even-numbered periods and 60 in odd-
numbered periods.  These result in average contributions over periods 1 through 9 of 23.6 and
44 respectively.Table 5
Mean Group Efficiency by Treatment: Periods 1 through 9









































































Average 32.85 91.52  83.70  42.82 57.96 
Note:
Efficiency in each period is equal to  , where   is the difference between 100( /￿) 
actual group profit (less subsidies) and the predicted Nash equilibrium baseline group profit
(L$84) and   is the difference between the Pareto optimal group profit (L$108) and the ￿
predicted Nash equilibrium baseline group profit.Table 6
Mean Group Subsidy Payment by Treatment in Lab Dollars: Periods 1 through 9









































































Average 0 26.0 15.0  1.7 9.8Table 7
Mean Group Profit (excluding subsidy) by Treatment in Lab Dollars: Periods 1 through 9
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  98.4 
103.3 
  81.4 
105.7 
102.8 
  85.6 
  97.7 
  92.4 
  93.2 
101.5 
  94.7 





  91.9  106.0  104.1    94.3    97.9 
Average
Cost Saving
14.1 12.2 2.4 6.0
Note:
Average cost saving under a subsidy treatment is the difference between average profits
(excluding the subsidy payment) under a subsidy treatment and the average profit in the
Baseline treatment.  The difference in profit is attributable to the increase in the use of the
R&D input.Table 8
Regression Coefficients Using Nine-Period Mean Group Investment in Input by Treatment




















































The common elements in both regressions are treatment dummy variables. The variable added
into Regression 2 is the number of cooperators in the group (mean = 1.111, standard deviation





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6Appendix 1.   Instructions 5and Record Sheets
1. Instructions for Baseline Treatment
2. Sample Payoff and Practice Questions
3. Baseline Record Sheet
4. Instructions for C1 Treatment in Round 2
5. C1 Treatment Record Sheet for Round 2
6. Instructions for C2 Treatment in Round 3
7. C2 Treatment Record Sheet for Round 3
8. Instructions for U1 Treatment in Round 3
9. U1 Treatment Record Sheet for Round 3
10. Instructions for U2 Treatment in Round 3
11. U2 Treatment Record Sheet for Round 3
12. Cumulative Payoff Sheet1
INSTRUCTIONS
General
This is an experiment in economic decision-making.  Various research foundations have
provided funds for this research.  The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully,
you may earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash.  As
researchers, we will learn from your decisions.  This is not an examination.  There are no correct
or incorrect decisions.
The Introduction
Each of you is a member of a 4-person group.  The other members of your group are in
the room, but you will not know who they are.  You produce a product which is sold in a market
at a predetermined price.  You can affect your profit from the sale of this product by the input
decision you make.  At the start of each decision period you and each of the other members of
your group receive an endowment of 15 tokens.  You will have to decide how many tokens you
will invest in an input used to reduce the cost of the product you produce.  Your profit from
production will depend upon the number of tokens you and others in your group invest in this
special input.  As the investment you and others make in the special input increases, your
production costs fall.  As your investment increases, however, your total cost of acquiring this
special input increases.
To assist you in making decisions, you have been provided with a payoff table which
shows how your payoff will be affected by what you invest in the special input and by what the
other members of your group invest in this input.
The Example
Included in your folder is a sample payoff table.  The numbers on the table are illustrative
only.  They do not provide any information about the actual decisions you will have to make after
we complete reviewing the instructions.  Please look at the sample payoff table.
Across the top of the sample table are the numbers 0 through 3.  These represent the
different number of tokens which you may invest in the special input.  In this example, your
maximum investment is 3 tokens.  The numbers 0 through 9 running down the left side of the
table are the different number of tokens which the other three participants together may invest in
this input.  Read question 1 on the sheet containing the sample payoff table.  In these examples,
you are player 4.
To find your earnings, you must find your investment on the table and the investment
made by player's 1, 2 and 3, together.  You invested 2 tokens.  Players 1, 2, and 3 together
invested 5 tokens.  You can find your payoff by reading across the row associated with an
Investment in the Input by Others of 5 (the sixth row from the top) to the column associated2
with Your Investment in the Input of 2 (the third column from the left).  The intersection of the
sixth row and the third column shows a payoff of 60 lab dollars.
To test your understanding of how payoffs are determined, please answer questions 2 and
3 on the sheet with the sample table.  Write the answers in the places indicated on the sheet.  If
you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will help you.
The Investment Problem
Included with these instructions, along with the sample payoff table, is the payoff table
which will be used during this session.  The payoff table shows the payoff that you will receive
from your investment and the investment of others in the input.  You may also use the payoff
table to determine the payoff of any member of the group conditional on the contribution that
person makes and the contributions made by the others.
 
You are participating in a decision-making session with three other people.  Each member
of each group will have an endowment of 15 tokens.  You will participate in two practice
periods, after  each period the members of the groups will be scrambled.  After the two practice
periods, you will participate in ten periods with the same group members and your decisions will
contribute to your earnings in the session.  After ten periods, the members of your group will be
changed, and you will receive a new set of instructions and you will participate in another round
(two practice periods and ten periods which will contribute to your earnings in the session).  You
will not know the identity of the members of your group in any period.
Each period you will have no more than 3 minutes to decide how many tokens you will
invest in the input.  You may not invest more than your endowment of tokens.  You are not
required to invest anything in this input.  The MESSAGE line of the computer screen in front of
you will display  the message You must invest between 0 and 15 tokens in the input.  It will
also be presented in the INSTRUCTIONS line on the screen with the message Please enter
period i investment between [0 - 15], where 15 is your endowment of tokens and i is the current
period.
The computer will display up to eight periods of information on your investments, the
investments of the other members of your group, and your payoffs based on the values on your
payoff table.  After the eighth period, the first period will be replaced by the ninth period's
investments and payoffs.  You must keep your own records of investments and payoffs for the
entire session on the record sheet which is included in your folder.  Your cumulative lab dollar
payoff based on the payoffs on the payoff table must be maintained on your record sheet.
Your cumulative lab dollar payoff on your record sheet will be converted into dollars at
the rate reported at the top of the record sheet.  At the end of the session (three rounds) this will
be paid to you in cash.3
You should not communicate to anyone other than the researchers during the session.  If
you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will help you.
Practice Periods
To begin the first practice period of this round, enter two (2) tokens as your investment in
the special input in the first practice period.  When the computer indicates the investments of
others and the payoff you receive, record these numbers on your record sheet.  
When the second practice period begins, select whatever investment you wish to make for
this period.  Record your investment, the investment of others, and your payoff on your record
sheet.  If this was not a practice period, you would also record your total profits over all periods
in the right-most column.
Again, you should not communicate to anyone other than the researchers during the
session.  If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will help you.
Technical Note
Formally, the payoff reported by the computer monitor, and on the payoff matrix, is
calculated using the equation
Lab Dollar Payoff = 48 - [576/(12 + x +Y)] - x        (1)
where x indicates the number of tokens you invest in the input and Y indicates the number of
tokens the others in your group invest in the input.  If there are four players in your group and
you are player 4,
Y = a + b + c          (2)
where a, b, and c are the investments in the input made by  player 1, player 2, and player 3,
respectively.  Each player has the same lab dollar payoff function.  Each payoff table is
constructed from the payoff function in (1) above.  Because each player has the same endowment
of tokens, each player's payoff table is the same as each other player's payoff table.SAMPLE PAYOFF TABLE AND PRACTICE QUESTIONS
         Your Investment 
  in the Input
0123
    Investment 0 2 02 53 03 5
           in 1 2 53 04 04 0
      the Input 2 3 04 55 04 5
        by the 3 3 54 06 05 0
       Others 4 4 04 57 05 5
        5 35 50 60 60
       6 3 04 55 05 5
7 2 53 03 54 0
8 2 02 53 03 5
9 1 52 02 53 0
Questions
1. If player 1 invests 1 token, player 2 invests 1 token, and player 3 invests 3 tokens, what
will be your payoff if you invest 2 tokens?
 Your earnings              
2. If player 1 invests 2 tokens, 3 invests 1, and you invest 3 tokens, what will be player 2's 
payoff if she invests nothing (0 tokens) and if she has the same endowment and payoff table as
you have?
     Player 2's earnings             
3. If player 1 invests 2 tokens, player 2 invests nothing (0 tokens), amd player 3 invests 1,
what will be your payoff if you invest 3 tokens?
 Your earnings             Subject I.D.                      Conversion Rate: 30 Laboratory Dollars = 1 Canadian Dollar
Record Sheet
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In addition to the payoff identified on the payoff table, your record sheet contains a
Payoff Adjustment (column E) which increases your profit by 0.75 lab dollars for each unit
of input in which you invest.  When you complete your record sheet, be certain to fill in this
column.  Your total profit, if correctly recorded on your record sheet, may be different
from the value shown on the computer screen by the value in column E.
Practice Periods
To begin the first practice period of this round, enter two (2) tokens as your investment in
the special input in the first practice period.  When the computer indicates the investments of
others and the payoff you receive, record these numbers on your record sheet.  Now complete the
box in column E for this practice period.  Your entry should be 0.75 times two (your investment
in the special input this period) or 1.50.  Write 1.50 in column E and enter the sum of columns D
and E in column F.
When the second practice period begins, select whatever investment you wish to make for
this period.  Record your investment, the investment of others, and your payoff from the monitor
on your record sheet.  Then multiply your investment in the special input by 0.75 and enter this in
column E.  Finally enter the sum of column D and E in column F.  If this was not a practice
period, you would also record your total profits over all periods in the right-most column.
Again, you should not communicate to anyone other than the researchers during the
session.  If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will help you.
Technical Note
Formally, the payoff reported by the computer monitor, and on the payoff matrix, is
calculated using the equation
Lab Dollar Payoff = 48 - [576/(12 + x +Y)] - x        (1)
where x indicates the number of tokens you invest in the input and Y indicates the number of
tokens the others in your group invest in the input.  If there are four players in your group and
you are player 4,2
Y = a + b + c          (2)
where a, b, and c are the investments in the input made by  player 1, player 2, and player 3,
respectively.  Each player has the same lab dollar payoff function.  Each payoff table is
constructed from the payoff function in (1) above.  Because each player has the same endowment
of tokens, each player's payoff table is the same as each other player's payoff table.  This payoff
table does not include any Column E Payoff Adjustments. Subject I.D.                      Conversion Rate: 30 Laboratory Dollars = 1 Canadian Dollar
Record Sheet












































01234567891 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5
E Value
0 0.75 1.5 2.25 3.0 3.75 4.5 5.25 6.0 6.75 7.5 8.25 9.0 9.75 10.5 11.251
ROUND THREE INSTRUCTIONS
In addition to the payoff identified on the payoff table, your record sheet contains a
Payoff Adjustment (columns E) which increases your profit by 0.75 lab dollars for each
unit of input in which you invest beyond the third unit.  If the numbers in columns E1 and
E2 are negative, your Payoff Adjustment is set equal to zero (0).  When you complete your
record sheet, be certain to fill in these columns.  Your total profit each period, if correctly
recorded on your record sheet, will be different from the value shown on the computer
screen by the value in column E3.
Your cumulative lab dollar payoff on your record sheet will be converted into dollars at
the rate reported at the top of the record sheet.  At the end of the session (three rounds) this will
be paid to you in cash.
You should not communicate to anyone other than the researchers during the session.  If
you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will help you.
Practice Periods
To begin the first practice period of this round, enter two (2) tokens as your investment in
the special input in the first practice period.  When the computer indicates the investments of
others and the payoff you receive, record these numbers on your record sheet.  Now complete the
box in column E1 for this practice period.  Your entry should be 2 (your investment in the special
input this period) minus 3, or -1.  Write -1 in column E1.  The entry in column E2 is - 0.75.  In
column E3 you enter zero (0) because your entry in column E2 is negative.  Now enter the sum of
columns D and E3 in column F.
When the second practice period begins, select whatever investment you wish to make for
this period.  Record your investment, the investment of others, and your payoff from the monitor
on your record sheet.  Then enter the difference between your investment in the special and 3 in
column E1.  Your entry in column E2 is 0.75 times the number in column E1.  If this number (in
column E2) is negative, your entry in column E3 will be zero (0).  If the number in column E2 is
positive, you enter this number in column E3.  Finally enter the sum of the numbers in column D
and column E3 in column F.  If this was not a practice period, you would also record your total
profits over all periods in the right-most column.
Again, you should not communicate to anyone other than the researchers during the
session.  If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will help you.2
Technical Note
Formally, the payoff reported by the computer monitor, and on the payoff matrix, is
calculated using the equation
Lab Dollar Payoff = 48 - [576/(12 + x +Y)] - x        (1)
where x indicates the number of tokens you invest in the input and Y indicates the number of
tokens the others in your group invest in the input.  If there are four players in your group and
you are player 4,
Y = a + b + c          (2)
where a, b, and c are the investments in the input made by  player 1, player 2, and player 3,
respectively.  Each player has the same lab dollar payoff function.  Each payoff table is
constructed from the payoff function in (1) above.  Because each player has the same endowment
of tokens, each player's payoff table is the same as each other player's payoff table.  This payoff
table does not include any Column E3 Payoff Adjustments. Subject I.D.                      Conversion Rate: 30 Laboratory Dollars = 1 Canadian Dollar
Record Sheet





























































0.75 Times the Number in Column  E1 
Number In
C o l u m n  E 101 2 3 4 56789 1 0 1 1 1 2
E2 Value 0 0.75 1.5 2.25 3.0 3.75 4.5 5.25 6.0 6.75 7.5 8.25 9.01
ROUND THREE INSTRUCTIONS
In addition to the payoff identified on the payoff table, your record sheet contains a
Payoff Adjustment (columns E) which increases your profit by 0.75 lab dollars for each
unit of input in which you invest (column E1) but which reduces your profit by 0.75 lab
dollars for each unit in which you invested in the previous period (column E2).  When you
complete your record sheet, be certain to fill in these columns.  Your total profit, if
correctly recorded on your record sheet, may be different from the value shown on the
computer screen by the sum of the values in columns E1 and E2.
Practice Periods
To begin the first practice period of this round, enter two (2) tokens as your investment in
the special input in the first practice period.  When the computer indicates the investments of
others and the payoff you receive, record these numbers on your record sheet.  Now complete the
box in column E1 for this practice period.  Your entry should be 0.75 times two (your investment
in the special input this period) or 1.50.  Write 1.50 in column E1.  Because this is your first
period, your investment in the previous period is zero.  Therefore, your entry in column E2 is
zero (0).  Now enter the sum of columns D, E1, and E2 in column F.
When the second practice period begins, select whatever investment you wish to make for
this period.  Record your investment, the investment of others, and your payoff from the monitor
on your record sheet.  Then multiply your investment in the special input by 0.75 and enter this in
column E1.  Your entry in column E2 will be 0.75 times two (your investment in the special
input in the previous period).  Finally enter the sum of column D and E1 minus the number in
column E2 in column F.  If this was not a practice period, you would also record your total
profits over all periods in the right-most column.
Again, you should not communicate to anyone other than the researchers during
the session.  If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will help you.
Technical Note
Formally, the payoff reported by the computer monitor, and on the payoff matrix, is
calculated using the equation
Lab Dollar Payoff = 48 - 576/(12 + x +Y) - x        (1)
where x indicates the number of tokens you invest in the input and Y indicates the number of2
tokens the others in your group invest in the input.  If there are four players in your group and
you are player 4,
Y = a + b + c          (2)
where a, b, and c are the investments in the input made by  player 1, player 2, and player 3,
respectively.  Each player has the same lab dollar payoff function.  Each payoff table is
constructed from the payoff function in (1) above.  Because each player has the same endowment
of tokens, each player's payoff table is the same as each other player's payoff table.  This payoff
table does not include any Column E1 and E2 Payoff Adjustments. Subject I.D.                      Conversion Rate: 30 Laboratory Dollars = 1 Canadian Dollar
Record Sheet
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Profit =
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01234567891 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5
E Value
0 0.75 1.5 2.25 3.0 3.75 4.5 5.25 6.0 6.75 7.5 8.25 9.0 9.75 10.5 11.251
ROUND THREE INSTRUCTIONS
In addition to the payoff identified on the payoff table, your record sheet contains a
Payoff Adjustment (columns E) which increases your profit by 0.75 lab dollars for each
unit of input in which you invest (column E1) but which reduces your profit by 0.75 lab
dollars for each unit in which you invested in the previous period (column E2).  If the
difference between the two numbers is negative (if the number in column E1 minus the
number in column E2 is negative), your Payoff Adjustment is set equal to zero (0).  When
you complete your record sheet, be certain to fill in these columns.  Your total profit each
period, if correctly recorded on your record sheet, will be different from the value shown
on the computer screen by the value in column E3.
Your cumulative lab dollar payoff on your record sheet will be converted into dollars at
the rate reported at the top of the record sheet.  At the end of the session (three rounds) this will
be paid to you in cash.
You should not communicate to anyone other than the researchers during the session.  If
you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will help you.
Practice Periods
To begin the first practice period of this round, enter two (2) tokens as your investment in
the special input in the first practice period.  When the computer indicates the investments of
others and the payoff you receive, record these numbers on your record sheet.  Now complete the
box in column E1 for this practice period.  Your entry should be 0.75 times two (your investment
in the special input this period) or 1.50.  Write 1.50 in column E1.  Because this is your first
period, your investment in the previous period is zero.  Therefore, your entry in column E2 is
zero (0).  In column E3 you enter  the difference between the values in columns E1 and E2.  
Now enter the sum of columns D and E3 in column F.
When the second practice period begins, select whatever investment you wish to make for
this period.  Record your investment, the investment of others, and your payoff from the monitor
on your record sheet.  Then multiply your investment in the special input by 0.75 and enter this in
column E1.  Your entry in column E2 will be 0.75 times two (your investment in the special
input in the previous period).  Your entry in column E3 will be the difference between the
numbers in E1 and E2.  Finally enter the sum of the numbers in column D and column E3 in
column F.  If this was not a practice period, you would also record your total profits over all
periods in the right-most column.
Again, you should not communicate to anyone other than the researchers during the
session.  If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will help you.2
Technical Note
Formally, the payoff reported by the computer monitor, and on the payoff matrix, is
calculated using the equation
Lab Dollar Payoff = 48 - 576/(12 + x +Y) - x        (1)
where x indicates the number of tokens you invest in the input and Y indicates the number of
tokens the others in your group invest in the input.  If there are four players in your group and
you are player 4,
Y = a + b + c          (2)
where a, b, and c are the investments in the input made by  player 1, player 2, and player 3,
respectively.  Each player has the same lab dollar payoff function.  Each payoff table is
constructed from the payoff function in (1) above.  Because each player has the same endowment
of tokens, each player's payoff table is the same as each other player's payoff table.  This payoff
table does not include any Column E3 Payoff Adjustments. Subject I.D.                      Conversion Rate: 30 Laboratory Dollars = 1 Canadian Dollar
Record Sheet
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012345 67 891 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 41 5
E Value 0 0.75 1.5 2.25 3.0 3.75 4.5 5.25 6.0 6.75 7.5 8.25 9.0 9.75 10.5 11.25Subject I.D.                   
Cumulative Payoff Sheet
(1) Total Payoff from Period 12 Column G                     
(2) Total Payoff from Period 24 Column G                     
(3) Total Payoff from Period 36 Column G                     
(4) Grand Total                     
(5) Grand Total Divided by 30                       
(6) Line (5) Value Rounded to Highest                     
Dollar
                                                                                                                                         

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2001-01 John B Burbidge 'Awkward Moments in Teaching Public Finance'
John F Graham Lecture at the Atlantic Canada
Economics Association Annual Meetings
2000-06 Alok Johri
Lohn Leach
Middlemen and the Allocation of Heterogeneous
Goods
2000-05 John B Burbidge
Gordon M Myers
Tariff Wars and Trade Deals with Costly Government
2000-04 Donald Dawson
Lonnie Magee
The National Hockey League Entry Draft, 1969-1995:















Externalities, Indivisibility, Nonreplicability and
Agglomeration